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Abstract
Developing explanations of observed phenomenon is one of the major functions of research
in Information Systems (IS). But what is an explanation? What types of explanation can IS
research provide and what do they mean? The objectives of this research are to develop a
shared language, to increase understanding of the meaning of research results and to
stimulate discussion of explanation in Information Systems research. Four years of articles
published in two top-ranked IS journals over a period of ten years were sampled based on
four explanation types defined in modern philosophy: covering-law, statistical-relevance,
pragmatic and functional. Explanation types, sub classifications ontologies and research
methods were classified and the relationships between these characteristics were examined.
Results reveal opportunities for studying Information Systems beyond a single explanation,
towards the use of a rich set of explanation types to fully describe phenomena.
Keywords: Explanation, ontology, methodology, information systems research.
Permanent URL: http://sprouts.aisnet.org/3-15
Copyright: Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works License
Reference: Hovorka, D.S., Germonprez, M., Larsen, K.R.T. (2003). "Explanation in
Information Systems," Case Western Reserve University, USA . Sprouts: Working Papers on
Information Systems, 3(15). http://sprouts.aisnet.org/3-15
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/3-15
HOVORKA, GERMONPREZ AND LARSEN/EXPLANATION IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
 
Introduction 
 
“A fundamental aim of science is to provide explanations of natural phenomenon” 
(Salmon 1989b, p.4). If the field of Information Systems (IS) is considered a science, it can be 
inferred that investigation into observations of IS phenomena is intended to result in an 
explanation. Some researchers point out the differences between the natural sciences and the 
technological or “sciences of the artificial.” (Simon 1969; Bunge 1979). Simon (1969) suggests 
that the explanation of artificial environments, like information systems, is built on the 
combination of prescribed explanation types from both natural (physiological) and artificial 
(computer science) reference disciplines. He states that “the relation between physiological and 
information-processing explanations will become just like the relations between quantum-
mechanical and physiological explanations in biology (or the relation between solid-state physics 
and programming explanations in computer science)” and that the two explanations “constitute 
two linked levels” through which information systems are explained (Simon 1969, p. 97). Bunge 
states that “determination is often multiple and probabilistic rather than simple and linear” 
(Bunge 1979, p. 270) and that some sciences focus on structure and behavior and others focus on 
composition and mechanism. We argue that this prescription of explanation types for specific 
scientific disciplines limits our understanding of phenomena. Instead, we argue that the 
interdisciplinary field of Information Systems, built from both natural and artificial scientific 
disciplines, relies on the mixing of explanation types from reference disciples through which 
research phenomena are understood and research agendas are shaped.  
This leads to the research question, “what types of explanation can IS research provide 
and what do they mean?” The value of examining the types of explanation is not obvious as we 
all have an intuitive understanding of “explanation.” For example, everyone has a common 
understanding of what it means to explain a game – we describe the rules. We explain that the 
driveway is wet because it rained. A nursery rhyme explains, “the kingdom was lost and all for 
the want of a horseshoe nail” (Owen 1989). We explain the length of the shadow by the height of 
the tower that casts it (Van Fraassen 1980). We explain that the behavioral intention to use an IT 
artifact lies, in part, in its perceived usefulness (Davis 1989). These examples represent different 
types of explanation, illustrate what explanation can provide, and show a need to clarify what an 
explanation means in a research context. 
One of the requirements for progress in any scientific field is the development of a 
paradigm or disciplinary matrix composed of a coherent body of literature and terminology, a set 
of methods and evaluative criteria, identified problems, models and exemplars (Kuhn 1962; 
Kuhn 1977). Deeply held models define both a field’s ontology and its epistemology (Kuhn 
1977), and determine the criteria for explanatory knowledge that provides scientific 
understanding (Salmon 1989b). There has been no direct discussion in the IS literature regarding 
the interpretation or meaning of research results – i.e. what type of explanation is the research 
providing about the relationships between entities in the world? There is a need to examine how 
IS purports to explain phenomena so a shared language and understanding can be developed to 
evaluate research findings and strengthen paradigms. 
To address these challenges we first examine how the Philosophy of Science has 
informed the IS field about the nature of the world (ontology), and how knowledge is obtained 
(epistemology). The relationship between the ontology and epistemology of IS is fundamental to 
understanding the debate regarding the nature of scientific explanation (Salmon 1989b; Hunt 
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1991). We identify the different types of explanation discussed in the literature and recognize 
that each type was introduced as the universal definition of explanation in science, not as 
typology of a coexisting set of categories. Therefore this paper focuses attention on the 
differences between research explanations rather than a means of reducing these concepts to 
categories (Deetz 1996).  
Second, we survey the field of Information Systems and describe the types of explanation 
used. Examination of the explanatory relationships entailed in research results benefits the IS 
field in the same manner that critiques of ontologies, methods, techniques, and tools have been 
valuable. Understanding of explanation in IS research may guide judgments about 
inconsistencies in the literature and expose opportunities for triangulation. Alternative 
explanations resulting from different theories or research approaches provide a means of 
critiquing accepted theory above and beyond analysis of how well a theory reflects the facts. We 
argue that from this perspective a “plurality of theories allows for a much sharper criticism of 
accepted ideas than does the comparison with the domain of facts which are supposed to sit there 
independently of theoretical considerations” (Feyerabend 1963, p. 923).  
In the examination of the use of explanation in the IS field, we explore how explanation 
in IS literature has changed during the past decade. In other research domains, a mature “system 
of inquiry” is one that “sweeps in” variables, theories, epistemologies, and explanation types 
from many disciplines to achieve progress in understanding phenomena (Churchman 1971). In 
this system, when agreement is reached on explanation of a phenomenon, counter-hypotheses are 
sought that “rock the boat, upset the apple-cart and encourage revolution and dissent…This is the 
only pathway to reality: whenever we are confident that we have grasped reality, then begins the 
new adventure to reveal our illusion and put us back again in the black forest” (Churchman 1971, 
p. 199). A change in emphasis and broadening of what explanation types are provided by 
research may indicate increasing maturity in the field and could reveal potential areas for future 
research. Finally we argue that research can benefit from this analysis by enabling researchers to 
identify and produce rich, multi-perspective explanations in the study of research phenomena 
(Mingers 2001), contributing to broader scientific understanding. 
 
 
Ontology Explanation Relationship  
 
Philosophical positions regarding the nature of science and the role of explanation by 
Karl Popper (1963), Carl Hemple (1962), Thomas Kuhn (1962), and Imre Lakatos (1973) have 
influenced the language and approach of scientific research. Researchers in IS have adopted 
many of the concepts from these traditions and have created a diverse set of ideas about what 
constitutes good theory (Straub et al. 1995; Sutton and Staw 1995; Gregor 2002), the existence 
and relevance of paradigms (Deetz 1996; Goles and Hirschheim 2000), the need to account for 
causality (Markus and Robey 1988; Lee et al. 1997) and discussion of the positivist-interpretivist 
dichotomy (Lee 1989; Lee 1991; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Fitzgerald and Howcroft 1998). 
IS research can be further informed by the field of philosophy in determining the nature 
and requirements of an explanation. The criteria of what constitutes an explanation is rooted in 
the beliefs about the nature of the world and the means of discovering knowledge which 
underlies all research. Philosophers recognize the distinction between descriptive knowledge that 
something occurred and explanatory knowledge why it occurred (Salmon 1989).  
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Citing Aristotle  (Physics II, Chapter 3), Ruben writes: 
“Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know until they have grasped 
the 'why' of it... In one sense (1) that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists is called 
‘explanation’...In another sense (2) the form or archetype... and its genera are called 
‘explanations'. Again (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest...Again (4) in a sense 
of end or 'that for the sake of which' a thing is done.... are all ways in which the term 'explanation' 
is used…. As the word has several senses, it follows that there are several explanations of the 
same thing.” (Ruben, 1990, p. 78) 
 
These early definitions of scientific explanation sought necessary and sufficient 
conditions, including teleological (purpose; final cause), formal (abstract structure), material 
(composition), and efficient (responsible agent) aspects of causation. Modern science focuses 
almost exclusively on the latter two aspects, but more importantly, Hemple and Oppenheim 
(1948) shifted the debate over the nature of scientific explanation to the position of explanations 
as deductive arguments (Salmon 1989a). This shift toward a positivist approach has engendered 
ongoing debate regarding theories and types of explanation in both the physical and social 
sciences. This work defines a positivist ontology as “studies premised on the existence of prior 
fixed relationships within the phenomena” (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, p. 5). 
Although the tenants of the positivist ontology have been described differently (Salmon 
1989b; Hunt 1991; Lee 1999), the original descriptions require that explanations rely on the 
presence of general laws and are referred to as nomological or covering-law models (Salmon 
1995b citing Hemple and Oppenheim 1948). Causal covering-law explanation is distinguished 
by the co-occurrence of events by asserting that whenever X occurs under condition C, Y must 
occur. Support for any theoretical covering-law results from continued confirmatory evidence 
supplied under manipulated conditions intended to suppress or bring about the effect in question. 
Different types of scientific explanations have gradually evolved to consider factors that are 
relevant to the event but not sufficient or necessary. Other types of scientific explanations 
emphasize the subject’s interpretation of the event or the context of the investigation. 
  The positivist ontology used in IS research often excludes human intentionality. This 
may be due, in part, to the rejection of cognition, motivation, and learning by psychology in the 
mid 20th century (Koch 1999). Yet Information Systems researchers are often interested in the 
beliefs and values of people, in their intentional actions and their chosen patterns of use. In the 
debate regarding the role of explanation in science, the proponents of nomological explanations 
describe social science in terms of the inevitability of the relationship between causal forces and 
behavioral outcome (Hemple 1996). The scientific validity of explanations referring to “mental” 
factors has been questioned and these factors are thought to be reducible within a materialist 
program (Salmon 1989a). Dissent with this view is based upon the complexity of human action 
(Hayek 1996), the distinction between the subject matter of social science and the natural 
sciences (Fay 1996), and the meaning of the behavior as viewed by the subject performing it 
(Fay and Moon 1996). Social science seeks to account not only for what happened and how it 
came about, but also the importance, meaning, and “why” the subject performed a specific action 
(Fay and Moon 1996). The distinction between objective, subjective, and inter-subjective 
research enables the differing aspects of the human world to be more completely understood 
(Mingers 2001; McDonald 2002). The goal of many studies is to describe, predict, or intervene 
in behavioral outcomes and the deeper understanding of why an action was performed requires 
an intentional account and a need for interpretation. This attachment of meaning to the world by 
the subjects has been termed the interpretative ontology (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Lee 
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1999) and is defined as research which assumes “that people create and associate their own 
subjective and inter-subjective meaning as they interact with the world” (Orlikowski and Baroudi 
1991, p. 5). Researchers may know that a statement was made and what the statement means, but 
they do not know why the statement was made. In the interpretive ontology, researchers have an 
incomplete explanation of the statement.  
Finally, critical social theory was used to represent a supradisciplinary philosophical 
perspective (Horkheimer 1972; Kellner 2001). The original purpose of critical social theory was 
to explain society through historical and contextual references across various scientific 
disciplines. Critical social theory seeks to explain social structures resulting in domination, 
articulate human activity striving to transform society (Kellner 2001), and explore the production 
of the false-consciousness (Agger 1991). A researcher using critical social theory is not 
concerned with such familiar concepts as usefulness, performance, or productivity, but instead is 
intent on explaining how influences guide individuals in their actions and describing individuals 
as socially and contextually constructed actors upon their environment. Data are not intended to 
prove or disprove theory but are used in understanding the regularities of process rather than 
cross-sectional differences (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, p. 20). 
 
 
 Explanation Types 
 
 The philosophy of science presents formal descriptions and requirements of the 
relationships entailed by explanations that differ from peoples’ everyday understanding. The past 
two centuries of philosophical discussion have produced a complex set of theories and models of 
explanation from which five major types can be extracted: descriptive/structural, covering-law, 
statistical-relevance, pragmatic and functional (Table 1).  
 
Descriptive/structural explanation can be characterized by the presentation of “objective” or 
“factual” accounts of the phenomena with no theoretical grounding or interpretation (Orlikowski 
and Baroudi 1991). Taxonomies, observations of an event and descriptions of the impact of an 
information technology on an organization are examples of structural/descriptive explanations.  
 
Covering-law explanation, is based upon Hemple’s (1962) Deductive-Nomological (D-N) and 
Inductive-Statistical (I-S) models of explanation (Salmon 1989b). Covering-law models present 
the logical relationship between the explanandum (the event to be explained) and the explanans 
(the premise, including at least one general law). The suitability of both these models for 
providing a basis for scientific explanation has been challenged based on counterexamples 
noting the asymmetry of explanation1 and the arbitrariness of statistical occurrence2. Although 
these two models have provided the fountainhead for discussion of explanation, the absence of 
universal laws in IS makes application of covering-law models difficult as the basis for 
explanation. 
 
                                                                 
1 A falling barometer allows inference that there has been a drop in air pressure but the drop cannot be explained by referring to 
the barometer. Rain will explain why a driveway is wet but a wet driveway doesn’t explain why it rained. 
2 In an experiment with two outcomes, X and Y with p<.05 and >.05 respectively, enough trials will produce some instances of 
Y. Therefore we can explain X but not Y. 
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Statistical relevance explanation (S-R) allows for multiple factors of low probability to have 
explanatory power (Salmon 1989a). S-R explanations was developed in response to criticism of 
covering law models which relied on causal relationships in which one condition, X, causes the 
occurrence of condition Y. But many IS phenomenon are influenced by a wide and variable set 
of factors that operate differently under different conditions or in different combinations. The 
role and identification of causal relationships and of necessary and sufficient conditions (Fay 
1996) in explanation is extremely controversial. This is due in part to the multiplicity and 
diversity of causes and the incompleteness of our knowledge of causal relationships. Causal 
models are also prone to intuitive holes 3 and suffer from coexistence laws4. The influence of a 
large number of casual factors leads to the use of statistical hypothesis testing and probabilistic 
explanations. This overcomes the objection to covering-law models of explanation in which the 
phenomenon to be explained must have a high probability of occurrence (Kitcher 1989). 
Statistical techniques are used to indicate the amount of variance in an outcome measure which a 
set of factors accounts for, and whether or not an hypothesis is significant at a pre-determined 
level (Polanyi 1958). There are a wide variety of statistical analyses used in quantitative IS 
research to explain the relationships between contributing factors and outcome measures.  
 
Pragmatic explanation is the fourth type of explanation (van Fraassen 1980). A pragmatic 
explanation is an answer to a why-question which involves not just the relationship between 
theory and fact, but also the context (Salmon 1989b). This view incorporates the concept of 
contrast-classes so that a question “Why X?” becomes “Why X rather than X*, X**….?” The 
suitability of an explanation is dependent on both the context of the question and the purpose of 
the questioner. In van Fraassen’s (1980) example of the explanation of the height of a tower, the 
architect’s explanation would result in a description of the plans where the builder’s explanation 
from might rely on the nature of the construction materials material and stability of the tower. 
But the answer to a specific contrast question “Why is the height h rather than h*” reveals that 
the length of the shadow cast by the building was important to the owner. This provides the 
relevant explanation (Kitcher 1989) for that particular question. The relevant explanation 
depends on who is asking the question and is specific to that particular question (Kitcher 1989). 
A pragmatic explanation may create several new questions involving other contrast-classes, 
which each have different explanations. 
 
Functional explanation, the final type, accounts for cases where legitimate explanations are 
provided by the end state or goals of a phenomenon (Salmon 1989b). First person descriptions of 
behavior are frequently couched in these terms: e.g. “Why did I go to the store? To buy 
spaghetti.” The future goal explains the event, based upon belief that the event will fulfill the 
goal. The explanation is correct even if the store has no spaghetti. Simply stated, the 
explanandum (to go to the store) is sufficient for the explanans (to buy spaghetti) given the 
conditions, but the explanans does not necessarily entail the explanandum. One controversial 
area relates to the problem of functional equivalents in which multiple mechanisms can bring 
about the same result depending on the context. This form of functional explanation is counter to 
the D-N model of explanation and significantly reduces the ability of functional explanations to 
provide predictive or prescriptive explanations.  
                                                                 
3 Even within Salmon’s “network of causal relations” we must identify which of the numerous antecedents actually caused the 
phenomenon. This becomes intractable when a specific phenomenon occurs under a wide variety of non-overlapping conditions. 
4 The Ideal Gas Law (PV=nRT) is a non-causal coexistence law which shows the relationship between pressure, volume, number 
of gas particles and temperature. If this type of law can be used in explanations then causes are not invoked by all explanations. 
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Explanation 
Type 
Definition 
Descriptive/ 
Structural 
Explanation 
Knowledge that a phenomenon occurs, a description of a phenomena, 
taxonomies and classification scheme. Work involving no theoretical 
grounding or interpretation of the phenomena; presentation of “objective, 
factual” accounts of events to illustrate an issue of interest (Orlikowski and 
Baroudi 1991, p.5). 
Covering-law 
Explanation 
An explanation of either the D-N or I-S type can be “described as an argument 
to the effect that the event to be explained was to be expected by virtue of 
certain explanatory facts” (Salmon 1989b, p.9). The explanatory facts must 
contain at least one universal or statistical law. 
Statistical 
Relevance 
Explanation 
“An explanation of a particular fact is an assemblage of facts statistically 
relevant to the fact-to-be-explained regardless of the degree of probability that 
results” (Salmon, 1989b, p.67). 
Pragmatic 
Explanation 
An explanation is a context dependent answer to a “why-question” (Van 
Fraassen 1980). Different explanations of the same instance will result from 
different questions. 
Functional 
Explanation 
“Explanations that are framed in terms of ends or goals” (Salmon 1989b, 
p.26). A given social practice[factor] has a certain effect. When it has that 
effect, there is some causal mechanism that ensures A continues to exist. 
When the practice stops having that effect, that mechanism stops working.  
 
Table 1. Explanation Types 
 
Explanation sub-classification 
The explanation types described above are characterized by different relationships 
between the phenomenon and the research outcome. Another distinction between explanations 
found in the literature is based on scope and completeness of the explanation. Partial 
explanations are concerned with explaining an event which is a sub-class of a larger phenomenon 
(e.g. an explanation is provided for why a person purchased an item online but not for why they 
chose a specific website) (Hunt 1991). Explanation sketches provide a general outline of a 
phenomenon by identifying some variables that might be related to the event and may include 
variables that the research determines are not related. Nomothetic explanation is used to explain 
a class of phenomenon with a parsimonious selection of variables (e.g. the Technology Adoption 
Model explains behavioral intention with two or three variables). Finally ideographic 
explanations aim at a full explanation of a single event by describing any possible influence on 
the phenomenon and context in question. These sub-classifications apply to all the explanation 
types in § 3 and are presented in Table 2. 
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Sub-
Classification 
Definition 
Partial 
Explanation 
“a proposed explanation is partial in the sense that [it] does not explain why k 
occurred but only that some phenomenon of type G occurred and that k is a 
subclass of G.” (Hunt 1991, p.91) 
Explanation 
Sketch 
“An explanation sketch implies that only a general outline of the explanation 
is offered” (i.e. here are some variables which might be related” [to the 
phenomena in question] (Hunt 1991, p.91) 
Nomothetic 
Explanation 
Seeks to parsimoniously explain a class of situations or events with just one or 
a few explanatory factors (Babbie 1998, p.34). 
Ideographic 
Explanation 
Aims at full explanation of a single instance through the enumeration of the 
numerous, perhaps unique, considerations that lie behind a given action 
(Babbie 1998, p.34). 
 
Table 2. Explanation Sub-Classifications 
 
The Fit of Artifact Designs, Research Frameworks and Mathematical Models 
Scientific interest in IS, driven by the pervasiveness and potential impact of information 
technology, has taken different forms. Although strongly influenced by the natural sciences 
model with its discovery and justification aspects (Hunt 1991; March and Smith 1995), IS 
research may also be oriented around artifact design theories, the development of research 
frameworks or predictive mathematical models (Gregor 2002).  
 
Artifact design research apply knowledge of situations and tasks to create effective artifacts 
(Simon 1969; March and Smith 1995). Design research fulfills a different purpose than studies 
whose goal is discovery or justification of knowledge. Rather than producing general theoretical 
knowledge, design frameworks apply knowledge “to create things which serve human purpose” 
(March and Smith 1995, p. 253). These articles are technology oriented and the products are 
judged against criteria of value and utility. This value-laden goal orientation differentiates these 
studies from value neutral studies of discovery or justification (Bunge 1979).  
 
Research frameworks recommend and motivate research in particular IS areas by identifying 
specific research questions, presenting theoretical perspectives and prior literature and 
suggesting dimensions or variable of interest and possible methodologies. This type of research 
frequently integrates diverse or fragmented literature and models into a comprehensible 
framework that provides guidance for future investigations. 
 
Mathematical models present a challenge to the standard theories of explanation and have 
largely been ignored in discussions regarding the nature of scientific explanation (Hafner and 
Mancosu 2003). The development of non-Euclidian geometries by Riemann and Lobatschevsky 
dispelled the tradition of mathematics as a-priori knowledge about the universe, which 
necessarily models the physical world (Kitcher 1983). The literature in the philosophy of 
mathematics now recognizes two distinct areas of mathematical explanation: the status of 
mathematical explanations within the domain of mathematics (e.g. the ontological reality of 
numbers; what mathematical proofs “explain”; for a review see Mancosu 2001; Hafner and 
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Mancosu 2003) and secondly, what mathematical representation of physical events actually 
explain.  
This current research only concerns itself with the latter case because we view 
mathematical representation as models, or “encapsulation of some slice of the real world within 
the confines of the relationships constituting a formal mathematical system” (Casti 1992, p.1 ). A 
model is thus the symbolic representation of some aspect of the modeler’s reality allowing 
exploration of the reality mirrored within a formal symbolic system. The quality of the model 
will depend on how well the observations of the phenomenon are characterized, which 
observations are selected to form the subsystem of reality, and how the subsystem is encoded to 
represent the phenomenon of concern. But models per se are not necessarily explanatory beyond 
describing phenomenon and showing relationships. For example, physical models, such as 
globes and scale models of objects, fit well into the category of descriptive explanation. Shapiro 
remarked that “a scientific explanation of a physical event often amounts to no more than a 
mathematical description of it” (Shapiro 2000, p. 34). Certainly there is something about the 
material world that makes the tools of mathematics particularly applicable. But how does a 
mathematical relationship make the physical world intelligible or “explain” a phenomenon? The 
ability to predict and control aspects of the real world made possible by mathematical models 
seems to indicate they are more than simple description. The issue of whether mathematical 
models are a subset of descriptive explanation or another type of explanation represents a 
difficult question. 
The correspondence rules by which observations are represented in mathematical models 
are critical because “clearly, a mathematical structure, description, model or theory cannot serve 
as an explanation of a non-mathematical event without some account of the relationship between 
mathematics per se and scientific reality” (Shapiro 2000, p. 35). So, the first criterion for 
mathematical models to be considered explanatory of an event outside the realm of mathematics 
is presentation of the correspondence rules by which the researcher “attaches symbolic 
expressions to nature” (Kuhn 1977, p. 301). Without these operational definitions, mathematical 
models are not explanatory outside their own constructs. 
Another perspective on mathematical models is gained by contrasting them with the types 
of explanations presented in §3. Statistical relevance explanation, which relies on mathematical 
analysis of the probabilistic influence of factors on outcomes, might appear to be closely related 
to mathematical models and invites close comparison. In science, all propositions rely on a set of 
auxiliary assumptions. During the process of scientific inquiry, the failure of propositions to pass 
critical tests may subject auxiliary assumptions to question and revision rather than cause 
rejection of the over-arching theory (Lakatos 1973). In contrast, mathematical propositions, such 
as 7+5 =12, are often considered necessary truths not subject to question. Central mathematical 
beliefs do not undergo radical changes in understanding and auxiliary mathematical assumptions 
are not revised. In addition, mathematical models are based upon proofs, which eliminate all 
doubt, not just reasonable doubt, and generally do not contain probabilistic predictions of 
outcomes (Shapiro 2000).  
The relationship between mathematical models and pragmatic explanation is more 
problematic. Whether explanations within mathematics can be answers to why-questions is the 
subject of debate (for discussion see Resnik and Kushner 1987; Sandborg 1998). Additionally, 
mathematical models do not account for the context and contrast-classes inherent in pragmatic 
explanations. Although individual models could be argued to contain elements of pragmatic 
explanation it is not a clear fit in most cases. 
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Despite the appearance of certainty and law-like behavior of variables within models, the 
lack of general laws in the human aspects of information systems phenomena makes 
classification of models as covering law explanations inadequate. Finally, although functional 
phenomenon (e.g. evolution) can be modeled, most mathematical models are built to predict 
specific outcomes under a known set of conditions and do not contain the post hoc goal 
orientation of functional explanations. 
 The difficulties in unambiguously fitting mathematical models into the theories of 
scientific explanations used in this research lead us to treat such papers as a separate category. 
This classification indicates that mathematical models do not fit the standard theories of 
explanation and leaves the question of whether such models are explanatory for future 
discussion. 
 
Research Study 
 
To understand explanation in Information Systems, a review of published research 
literature in two IS Journals in the years 1990-91 and 2000-01 was conducted. Target journals 
were Information Systems Research (ISR) and Management Information Systems Quarterly 
(MISQ). These journals are consistently ranked as the top two IS journals and provide a suitable 
sample for focusing attention on the differences between research explanations. Non-consecutive 
years of publication were selected to provide a longitudinal view across a ten-year span and 
allow changes to be tracked. The total number of articles reviewed (167) is consistent with 
previous literature describing characteristics of IS (e.g. DeLone and McLean 1992; Orlikowski 
and Iacono 2001).  
The primary classification and sub-classification of articles was based on the type of 
explanation presented earlier and shown in Tables 1 and 2. The ontological perspectives 
described in §2 and research method for each study were also coded. Research methods are from 
Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) and include experimental, case study, survey, field study, mixed 
method, instrument development, and action research. The duration of the research: cross-
section/snapshot, multiple snapshot, and longitudinal was also recorded. 
 Although assignment of explanation types to individual papers was usually clear, some 
cases were ambiguous, requiring interpretation due to the difficulty in specifying exact 
classification boundaries and the presence of multiple explanatory elements in some studies. For 
example, some pragmatic explanations relied extensively on statistical analysis (and vice versa) 
and some mathematical models relied on extensive description of the phenomena. Other 
combinations of overlaps also occurred. In these cases we interpreted the primary purpose of the 
research (e.g. was the paper presenting a model with a description of the problem or was the 
research testing a model and presenting statistical evidence?).  
Coding was performed by three coders. Two primary coders were responsible for coding 
the entire data set and a “coding moderator” resolved differences between the primary coders 
(DeLone and McLean 1992). Two coders were faculty as major research universities and one 
was a fourth year doctoral student. The two coders and the moderator met regularly over the 
course of nine months to discuss and resolve ontological, explanatory, and methodological 
differences coded from the articles. The rate of coding agreement is shown in Table 3. 
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Coded Category Percent Agreement 
Explanation Type 79% 
Explanation Subclass 86% 
Ontology 91% 
Research Method 92% 
Research Duration 90% 
 
Table 3. Coding Agreement  
 
Findings 
The goal of this work is to stimulate reflection on the types of explanations provided by 
research in Information Systems. The research demonstrates that IS research articles have a 
variety of distinct investigative purposes and produce different types of explanation. There were 
three research types represented in this sample (Table 4); 49 articles present either designs for 
systems, frameworks for research or mathematical models (30% of total articles). These research 
articles were not intended to produce explanatory results of the types distinguished by the 
philosophy of science but rather present artifact designs, research programs or representations 
(models) of phenomena. Therefore, these articles were not coded for sub classifications, 
ontology, research methods or durations.  
Of the articles whose purpose was to present discovery of explanations of IS phenomena, 
descriptions/structural explanations (41%) and statistical relevance explanations (59%) dominate 
the types represented. Over the four years of articles in the twelve-year span examined, the 
percentage of descriptions decreased (from 30% to 20%) and researchers relied more heavily on 
statistical analysis of factors (28% increasing to 42%). Pragmatic explanations (15%), which are 
differentiated based upon the explicit reliance on contrast classes, frequently rely on statistical 
methods of analysis. If these articles are classified on that basis, the reliance on statistical 
relevance is more dominant. But the slight increase in occurrence of pragmatic explanations may 
be due in part to explicit comparison between contrast classes (e.g. “Why system X rather than 
System X*”) and increasing interest in specific aspects of systems (e.g. “Why did these users 
adopt the system” vs. “Why did these users adopt this system rather than that one.”) 
There are few occurrences of functional explanation despite the goal-orientation of 
information systems. This may be due, in part, to the emphasis in IS on prediction and 
intervention. Functional analysis may represent a useful perspective particularly for explanations 
of phenomena influenced by human intentionality or modeled as evolutionary processes.  
Additionally, 76 (64%) of studies were explanation sketches providing only some 
relevant variables. The percentage of explanation sketches increased from 58% to 69% of all 
explanatory research between the two time periods. Since these studies identify only some of the 
factors involved in the phenomena, they represent an opportunity for further research that can 
provide more complete explanations and for research to produce more parsimonious, nomothetic 
explanations.  
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1990-1991 2000-2001 Total 
Description/Structural 24 (30%) 17 (20 %) 41 (25%) 
Covering Law 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Statistical Relevance 23 (28%) 36 (42%) 59 (35%) 
Pragmatic 6 (7%) 9 (10%) 15 ( 9%) 
Explanation 
Type 
Functional 2 (2%) 1 (1%) 3 (2%) 
Framework/Model 21 (26%) 17 (20%) 38 (23%) Other 
research Mathematical Model 5 (6%) 6 (7%) 11 (7%) 
 Total 81(100%) 86 (100%) 167 (100%) 
 
Partial 2 (4%) 0 (0%) 2 (2%) 
Sketch 32 (58%) 44 (69%) 76 (64%) 
Nomothetic 5 (9%) 7 (11%) 12 (10%) 
Sub-
classification 
Ideographic 16 (29%) 13 (20%) 29 (25%) 
 Total 55(100%) 64 (100%) 119 (100%) 
 
Table 4. Explanation Types 
 
 1990-1991 2000-2001 Total 
Positivist 37 (69%) 56 (92 %) 93 (81%) 
       Positivist 
(Narrative) 9 (17%) 1 (2 %) 10 (9%) 
Interpretivist 8 (15%) 4 (7%) 12 (10 %) 
Positivist & 
Interpretivist 1 (<1%) 2 (<1%) 3 (<1%) 
Ontology 
Critical Theory 0 % 0 % 0 % 
 Total 55 (100%) 63 (100%) 118 (100%) 
Experiment 10 (18%) 17 (28%) 28 (24%) 
Case Study 12 (22%) 13 (20%) 25 (21%) 
Survey 11 (20%) 14 (22%) 25 (21%) 
Field Study 8 (15%) 7 (11%) 15 (13%) 
Mixed Method 7 (13%) 2 (3%) 9 (8%) 
Instrument 
Development 3 (6%) 0 (0 %) 3 (3%) 
Research 
Method 
Other 4 (7%) 10 (16%) 14 (12%) 
 Total 55 (100%) 63 (100%) 118 (100%) 
Snapshot/Cross-
section 36 (66%) 36 (58%) 73 (62%) 
Multi-snapshot 4 (7%) 7 (11%) 11 (9%) 
Duration 
Longitudinal 15 (27%) 20 (31%) 35 (30%) 
 Total 55 (100%) 63 (100%) 118 (100%) 
 
Table 5. Ontologies, Research Methods, and Durations 
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Ontologies, research methodologies, and research durations from the sample are 
presented in Table 5. Of the 93 (81%) articles that are positivist, 32 (31%) are 
description/structural explanations. Of these descriptions, 10 (9%) are narrative descriptions with 
no quantitative analysis. The appearance of interpretivist studies decreased (from 15% to 7%) 
and few studies viewed the phenomenon from both perspectives. Overall these results are 
consistent with results from previous studies of ontologies in IS (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). 
Although there is a tendency for specific research methods to produce specific 
explanation types (e.g. experiments result in statistical relevance explanations in 78% of the 
papers), experiments can also result in descriptive, pragmatic and functional explanations. 
Conversely, other research methods can also be used to produce statistical relevance 
explanations (e.g. case study, survey, field study, mixed method). Explanatory outcomes are 
unrelated to research durations. The lack of binding of specific explanatory outcomes to specific 
research methods or research durations poses both opportunities and pitfalls for researchers. 
Producing a richer set of explanations does not necessitate a change in method or duration. But at 
the same time, changing methods does not necessarily avoid replicating previous explanations of 
the phenomena. The relationship between explanation type, research method and research 
duration is presented in Table 6. 
 
Explanation Type  
Descriptive Statistical Relevance Pragmatic Functional
Experiment  3 (11%) 21 (78%) 2 (7%) 1 (4%) 
Case Study 18 (72%) 2 (8%) 5 (20%) 0 
Survey 7 (28%) 14 (56%) 2 (8%) 2 (8%) 
Field Study 7 (47%) 5 (33%) 3 (20%) 0 
Mixed Method 3 (33%) 5 (56%) 1 (11%) 0 
Instrument 
Development 1 (33%) 2 (67%) 0 0 
Research 
Method 
Other 3 (21%) 9 (64%) 2 (14%) 0 
 Total 118      
Snapshot/Cross-
section 21 (30%) 38 (52%) 10 (14%) 3 (4%) 
Multi-snapshot 1 (9%) 7 (67%) 3 (27%) 0 
Duration 
Longitudinal 20 (57%) 13 (37%) 2 (6%) 0 
 Total 118     
 
Table 6. Explanation Types, Research Method, and Research Durations 
 
Lastly, while not directly related to explanation, the research showed that ontological 
perspectives are not bound to specific research methods or durations. This supports the argument 
that a pluralist methodology is possible within single ontological perspectives (Mingers 2001). It 
is research methods, not ontology, that “focuses on different aspects of reality” (Mingers 2001, p. 
241) and through mixed-methods a variety of explanations of particular phenomena can be 
provided. Table 7 shows the ontology-research method relationship.  
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Discussion 
 
This study of explanation in Information Systems is informative in four ways. First, we 
argued that the prescription of a singular “best practice” explanation type is not possible in the 
interdisciplinary field of Information Systems. This thinking extends Simon (1969) who 
suggested that specific disciplines carry specific explanation types used to describe phenomena 
in the field. We contend that in order to fully understanding research phenomena and build 
research streams in Information Systems, researchers should recognize parallel, supportive 
explanation types from a variety of reference disciplines, whether natural science or computer 
science. Not recognizing the varieties and limitations of explanations in research may lead to 
confusion about the meaning and scope of research results. 
 
 
Ontology  
Positivist Interpretive 
Experiment 27 (26%) 0 
Case Study 19 (18%) 5 (41%) 
Survey 25 (24%) 0 
Field Study 10 (10%) 5 (42%) 
Mixed Method 7 (7%) 0 
Instrument 
Development 3 (3%) 0 
Research 
Method 
Other 12 (12%) 2 (17%) 
 Total 115* 
   
Snapshot/Cross-
section 64 (62%) 6 (50%) 
Multi-snapshot 9 (8%) 1 (8%) 
Duration 
Longitudinal 30 (29%) 5 (42%) 
 Total 115*   
 * 3 studies not included in this total specifically 
used both positivist and interpretive approaches 
and varied methods or durations within the same 
study 
 
Table 7. Ontologies and Research Methods and Research Duration 
 
 
Second, by explicating the language and terminology used in describing types of 
explanation, we increase the understanding of what research results mean, both in terms of the 
relationship of the results to the objective and interpreted world and of the scope and 
completeness of the explanation. This provides additional criteria for assessing research results 
and can lead to insights about future research. Additionally, we provide a clearer picture of the 
variety of outputs produced in IS research by recognizing the distinction between research 
intended to design systems and research intended to discover explanations of phenomena.  
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Third, we demonstrate that the IS field is focused on the models of material and efficient 
causation, which lies at the core of the natural science model. IS research is dominated by 
positivist studies which predominantly produce statistical relevance explanation. These are 
usually sketches of some of the variables related to phenomena. This reveals opportunities to 
pursue more parsimonious nomothetic explanations focused on the variables or antecedents most 
significant to the outcome. This study reveals opportunities to exploit other types of explanation 
in the pursuit of fuller explanations. In particular, pragmatic explanations may be of interest to 
practitioners who are interested in asking questions based on specific perspectives. Since the 
field involves the study of goal-oriented systems, the pursuit of functional oriented research may 
provide valuable insights.  
Finally, this research shows that, although there is a propensity to produce specific types 
of explanations after choosing specific ontologies and methods, the explanation type produced is 
not determined by those perspectives. This presents opportunities and problems as researchers 
seek to extend scientific understanding through triangulation or the mixing of methods. Mingers 
(2001) presents arguments for “critical pluralism” in research programs to achieve greater 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. His arguments are based upon the ability 
to combine positivist and interpretive perspectives and utilize a variety of methods within these 
perspectives. But the choice of method and perspective for subsequent research is not clear. It is 
possible to unintentionally replicate previous explanations even with a different ontology and 
different research methods. Analysis of the type of explanation provided by previous research 
may present guidance for subsequent research and result in fuller explanation of the phenomena. 
For example, a descriptive explanation of the phenomenon can provide background, show 
boundaries and context of the research, and lay out the researcher’s relationship to the setting. 
Subsequent experimental methods may provide a statistical relevance explanation sketch of 
certain variables related to phenomena within the context. This may be followed by survey or 
interview based research providing pragmatic explanation of specific aspects of the phenomena 
in a parsimonious (nomothetic) manner. Each aspect of the research is guided by the explanation 
provided in preceding work and in aggregate this process provides a fuller explanation than any 
single piece of research. 
To illustrate the critical pluralism approach with regard to explanation types, research 
streams within Information Systems can be built on the variety of explanation types produced as 
a basis for deepening scientific understanding of particular phenomena. Early work on media 
richness theory was based on predictive ability and the formation of generalizable laws 
(covering-law/nomothetic explanation). The theory proposed that media have specific structural 
characteristics that define the ability of the media to reduce equivocality or uncertainty. The 
original framework defined the relationship between media channels and equivocal and uncertain 
tasks and was later extended to predict how organizational design can support information needs 
(Daft and Lengel 1984). Later work extended media richness theory by accounting for the role 
social influence and organizational context played in defining media richness (see Schmitz and 
Fulk 1991; Markus 1994; Lee 1994). These examinations showed how an apparently simple 
information request was actually a message rich with information and subtle meaning and these 
studies generally represented pragmatic/ideographic explanations where single instances of 
media richness were explained through contextually dependent environments. Media richness 
was then examined by Ngwenyama and Lee (1997) who applied the critical theory ontology to 
the work of Daft and Lengel (1984) and Markus (1994). Ngwenyama and Lee effectively used a 
new ontological perspective through which a new theory of media richness was developed (pg. 
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163). Resembling the pragmatic/ideographic explanation used in the earlier social influence 
studies, the Ngwenyama and Lee study actually distanced itself from earlier media richness work 
through new theory development. This allows for what appears to be the “reuse” of the same 
explanation type to actually be a unique instance of an explanation type in the investigation of 
new theory.  
These research projects formed a collective research stream through which media 
richness theory was examined from different ontological perspectives, using different methods 
and producing different types of explanation. Further studies are needed to identify research 
streams in Information Systems and the types of explanation that has been provided across the 
studies. This would give researchers a detailed understanding of how phenomena within that 
stream are explained in addition to identifying the ontology and methods used. Identifying gaps 
in the way phenomena are explained provides researchers new avenues through which to 
advance scientific understanding and shape the evaluative criteria, identified problems, models 
and exemplars of the IS disciplinary matrix.  
Both the academic and practitioner communities will benefit from understanding the 
scope of research explanations and the implications for the relevance of research. By examining 
explanation types and associated terminology and showing the relationships between 
explanations, ontologies and methods, researchers are better equipped to understand what the 
research literature and their own research is, in fact, explaining. 
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